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Comments
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION AND RADIO BROADCASTINGt
In 1920 there was only one radio station in the United States.,
Expenses for its operation were met by means of the toll system.
This was very unsatisfactory, so for a time the growth of radio
was slow. In 1924, however, the American Telephone and Tele-
graph Company hit upon the idea of leasing broadcasting facili-
ties to advertisers.2 The effectiveness of this new medium of
advertising was soon recognized. Thereafter radio became a busi-
ness in the United States."
Radio is now one of the most important factors in our eco-
t This comment was a prize winning essay in the 1940 Nathan Burkan
Memorial Competition.
1. Shafter, Musical Copyright (1932) 246.
2. Caldwell, Piracy of Broadcast Programs (1930) 30 Col. L. Rev. 1087.
3. Id. at 1087-1088.
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nomic life. In twenty years the business has grown from virtually
nothing to giant super corporations with capitalizations of mil-
lions of dollars. It has created vast markets for its own products
as well as markets for the products of others. Moreover, in its
need for technical experts, radio has made possible thousands of
new jobs that have contributed to the income of the working
American public. Consequently, it can be said that radio today is
an indispensable part of the American economic scheme.
The development of this new business in so short a time has
brought a myriad of new legal problems to occupy the attention
of the copyright lawyer. These problems have been occasioned
by the rapid technical developments which are being made in
radio. Consequently, the use of judicial precedent is not readily
adaptable. The legal panorama is constantly changing. For that
reason the purpose of this paper is to discuss as of today the
rights possessed by composers, artists and performers in the field
of radio broadcasting.
BASIS OF COPYRIGHT LAW
The copyright law of the United States is founded both on
the Constitution and the common law. Article I Section 8, of the
Federal Constitution provides: "The Congress shall have power
. . . to promote the progress of science and the useful arts, by
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive
right to their respective writings and discoveries." As this power
is given exclusively to the federal government, any legislation
concerning copyright must emanate from Congress. It is entirely
within the discretion of that body as to what rights shall be pro-
tected under the copyright laws. However, the power vested in
Congress has not prevented the courts from granting relief to
individuals in those instances where Congress has failed or re-
fused to afford protection under the copyright laws. This has
been done by resort to the common law. The theory is that the
only effect of the constitutional provision giving the copyright
power to Congress is to enable that body to create a new group
of rights as a substitute for those given by the common law. In
the absence of legislation the old common law rights remain
unaffected. Today, therefore, it would seem that every expression
of human thought is protected.4
The difference between the protection given under the com-
4. See Well, American Copyright Law (1917) 159 et seq., 406 et seq., where
the cases are collated. Cory v. Physical Culture Hotel, 14 F. Supp. 977 (W.D.
N.Y. 1936), noted in (1936) 7 Air L. Rev. 319.
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mon law right' and that given under the statutory right 6 is funda-
mental. Under the common law, so long as a work remains
unpublished an author is given a perpetual monopolistic right
in his creation. Sometimes a limited and restricted publication is
permitted; but general publication means loss of rights.7 Further-
more, such rights are enforced under state law." On the other
hand, statutory rights are those rights which attach if the pro-
cedure prescribed in the copyright act has been followed. Such
rights include principally the privilege of unlimited publication
for a period of twenty-eight years, with a like privilege of re-
newal for an additional twenty-eight years. The right of publi-
cation is exclusive and any question concerning it is decided
according to federal law.' In short, the common law rights are
those which protect before publication while statutory rights are
those given after publication." These two types of rights have
been consecrated in the copyright act of 1909, which is the latest
legislative expression on copyright law. 1
PUBLICATION
Since, as has been seen, all rights must ultimately depend
on a congressional act or the common law, and since the rights
that flow from these two sources differ, it becomes necessary to
determine when each type is applicable in order to know the
applicable rules. When there has been publication and the copy-
right act has not been complied with, the work is deemed to
5. Donaldsons v. Beckett, 4 Burr. 2408, 98 Eng. Reprint 257 (1774);
Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 8 L.Ed. 1055 (1834); Caliga v. Inter Ocean
Newspaper Co., 215 U.S. 182, 30 S.Ct. 38, 54 L.Ed. 150 (1909); Palmer v. De-
Witt, 47 N.Y. 532, 7 Am.Rep. 480 (1872).
6. 35 Stat. 1075 (1909), 17 U.S.C.A. § 1062 (1927), as amended.
7. Shafter, op. cit. supra note 1, at 85 et seq.
8. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 8 L.Ed. 1055 (1834).
9. See notes 5 and 7, supra.
10. See footnote 5 in Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, 327 Pa. 433,
439, 194 Atl. 631, 634 (1937). "It has long been a subject of discussion as to
whether common-law rights in literary property survive publication, and
whether, therefore, the copyright statute has restricted or broadened such
rights. The early English view seems to have been that publication does not
defeat the rights of proprietorship at common law: Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr.
2303, 98 Eng. Reprint 201 (1774); Donaldsons v. Beckett, 4 Burr. 2408, 98 Eng.
Reprint 257 (1774). The American view has been to the contrary, and holds
that the common law right is confined to the first publication: Wheaton v.
Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 8 L.Ed. 1055 (1834); Caliga v. Inter Ocean Newspaper Co.,
215 U.S. 182, 30 S.Ct. 38, 54 L.Ed. 105 (1909); Palmer v. DeWitt, 47 N.Y. 532, 7
Am.Rep. 480 (1872); Bamforth v. Douglass Post Card Machine Co., 158 Fed.
355 (E.D. Pa. 1908).
11. This has been held to be constitutional although no time limit is spec-
ified in the copyright act. Marx v. United States, 96 F. (2d) 204 (C.C.A. 9th,
1938).
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have been dedicated to the public. The result of such dedication
is loss by the author of both common law and statutory rights.
The copyright act defines publication as "the earliest date when
copies of the first authorized edition were placed on sale, sold,
or publicly distributed by -the proprietor of the copyright or
under his authority.' 1 2 However, as subsequently defined by the
courts, this section merely fixes the date from which the copy-
right term begins to run and is not a general definition of publi-
cation.18 Consequently, the decided cases must be examined in
order to determine if there has been a publication. There exists
great confusion among the authorities. It has been held that the
production of a play,14 the delivery of a lecture,15 the playing of
a musical composition, 16 the exhibition of a painting,"' or a per-
formance over the radio,18 does not constitute a sufficient publi-
cation to operate as an abandonment to public use. On the other
hand, the single sale of a book is a publication 9 as is the leasing2
or lending2 ' of copies of a book to any member of the public who
applies therefor. It has even been held that the public deposit
of copies of a book, though made to procure a copyright, is a
publication. 22 Therefore, the question that arises is: What test
should be used to determine when there has been a publication?
The better considered cases seem to make the apparent intent
of the publisher the determinative factor.2' This theory, however,
is subject to the criticism that a strict compliance therewith
would permit the publisher to secure to himself a right greater
than that granted him by the copyright statute merely by making
clear his intention not to abandon the material to the public.2 4
12. 35 Stat. 1087-1088 (1909), 17 U.S.C.A. § 62 (1927).
13. Cardinal Film Corp. v. Beck, 248 Fed. 368 (S.D. N.Y. 1918); Patterson
v. Century Productions, 93 F. (2d) 489 (C.C.A. 2d, 1937).
14. Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424, 32 S.Ct. 263, 56 L.Ed. 492 (1912).
15. Nutt v. National Institute, Inc. for the Imp. of Memory, 31 F. (2d) 236
(C.C.A. 2d, 1929).
16. McCarthy & Fischer, Inc. v. White, 259 Fed. 364 (S.D. N.Y. 1919).
17. American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 28 S.Ct. 72, 52
L.Ed. 208 (1907).
18. Uproar Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 F.Supp. 358 (D.C. Mass.
1934).
19. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 8 L.Ed. 1055 (1834).
20. Jewelers' Mercantile Agency v. Jewelers' Weekly Pub. Co., 155 N.Y.
241, 49 N.E. 872, 41 L.R.A. 846 (1898).
21. Ladd v. Oxnard, 75 Fed. 703 (C.C. Mass. 1896).
22. Jewelers' Mercantile Agency v. Jewelers' Weekly Pub. Co., 155 N.Y.
241, 49 N.E. 872, 41 L.RA. 846 (1898).
23. Werckmeister v. American Lith. Co., 134 Fed. '321, 68 L.R.A. 591
(C.C.A. 2d, 1904); Berry v. Hoffman, 125 Pa.Super. 261, 189 Atl. 516 (1937).
24. Jewelers' Mercantile Agency v. Jewelers' Weekly Pub. Co., 155 N.Y.
241, 49 N.E. 872, 41 L.R.A. 846 (1898).
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This objection, though, might be met by the argument that the
courts can be relied on to prevent such an abuse. Furthermore,
this particular objection would be more than offset by the cer-
tainty which would result in the law of copyright with respect
to publication. The facts and circumstances of publication would
indicate whether or not the publisher intended to relinquish
dominion over the property.25
The case of Uproar Company v. National Broadcasting Com-
pany,26 illustrates how an application of the doctrine of intent
would operate. In that case one Wynn wrote a script for the
Texaco Company. Later he reprinted the script and assigned it
to the plaintiff with the promise that he would mention the
assignment and publication on the radio program. Wynn was
prevented from doing this by defendant, the Texaco Company.
Plaintiff thereupon applied for an injunction to prevent the de-
fendant from interfering with Wynn. The defendant, in turn,
applied for an injunction to prevent the plaintiff from printing
or selling the script. The court held that the contract of employ-
ment between Wynn and the Texas Company implied a covenant
that the author would not authorize another to use the script
and that the plaintiff, as a member of the public, obtained no
rights through publication since "the rendering of the perfor-
mance before the microphone cannot be held to be an abandon-
ment of it to the public at large." Had the decision been based
on the theory of intent either result could have been reached. It
is submitted that this theory would have been the proper basis.
The ground on which the court placed its decision was that no
performance over the radio will constitute a performance within
the meaning of the copyright act. This appears too broad.
THE PUBLIC PERFORMANCE FOR PROFIT CLAUSE
Once it has been determined that there has been no dedica-
tion to the public the next question that presents itself is: With
special reference to broadcasting, when has there been an in-
fringement of a copyrighted work? When the copyright act was
passed, radio broadcasting had not yet come into existence. For-
tunately for the composer, however, his right to broadcast was
25. In Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, 327 Pa. 433, 444, 194 Atl.
631, 636 (1937), the court said: "In determining whether or not there has been
such a publication, the courts look partly to the objective character of the
dissemination and partly to the proprietor's intent in regard to the relin-
quishment of his property rights."
26. 8 F.Supp. 358 (D.C. Mass. 1934). See also Brown v. Nolle, 20 F.Supp.
135 (S.D. N.Y. 1937).
[Vol. III
COMMENTS
not considered any new right which had to be created specially
by Congress: the courts merely extended the "public perform-
ance for profit" clause of the copyright act to cover the case.27
That clause gives to anyone complying with the provisions of the
act ". . . the exclusive right ... to perform the copyrighted work
publicly for profit if it be a musical composition and for the pur-
pose of public performance for profit. .. ." What acts come within
the clause is a matter for determination by the courts.
That the rendition of any artistic endeavor before a micro-
phone is a performance is a proposition too obvious for success-
ful contradiction. Perhaps this accounts for the dearth of cases
on the point. At any rate, the arguments advanced for the non-
applicability of the "public performance clause" to radio are gen-
erally grounded on three theories: (1) A performance before a
microphone is not public; (2) If the original broadcast is licensed,
then a license to receivers to pick up the broadcast and use it for
any purpose is implied; and (3) There is no profit. The first
theory is used exclusively by broadcasters; the second is used
by receivers only; the third is used by both.
When a performance is public
Concerning the first theory mentioned above it was early
argued that performance before a microphone was not a public
performance within the meaning of the copyright act. But in
Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. American Automobile Accessories
Company,5 a case which has apparently settled the law on the
point, the court had no difficulty in finding the performance a
public one. The court stated that for a performance to be public
it is not necessary that it be rendered in a stadium, public square,
theater or any other place where such things are usually held;
nor is it necessary that there be a visible audience. Broadcasting
is merely a new mode of rendering a performance, and the fact
that a person is able to enjoy it in the privacy of his home does
not make it any the less public. This case had the effect of sweep-
ing away the old definition of performance which depended on
a simple criterion: Are the people who attend the performance
27. 35 Stat. 1075 (1909), 17 U.S.C.A. § 1(e) (1927).
28. 5 F. (2d) 411 (C.C.A. 6th, 1925), cert. denied 269 U.S. 556, 46 S.Ct. 19,
70 L.Ed. 409 (1925). See Sprague, Copyright-Radio and the Jewell-LaSalle
Case (1932) 3 Air L. Rev. 417, in which the author questions whether the
Remick case is still good law in view of the holding In Buck v. Jewell-La-
Salle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 51 S.Ct. 410, 75 L.Ed. 971 (1931), to the effect that
the public does not receive the broadcaster's performance but a reproduction
of it which the listener creates through the medium of his receiving set.
19401
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of the type likely to pay for admission to hear it performed at
a theater or concert hall?2 9 In short, by the new rule the perform-
ance itself, rather than the audience, becomes the test.30 England
and the Dominions have also unqualifiedly recognized this view.31
Implied License
Not infrequently a person devises a scheme whereby he picks
up a broadcast and utilizes it for commercial purposes. It has
been argued that this practice is permissible under the original
license to broadcast. This view finds support in one district court
case3 2 and in a footnote to a Supreme Court decision.3 3 However
it is well settled that an unauthorized public reception for profit
of an unlicensed broadcast constitutes an infringement.3 4 Since
the Supreme Court has held that reception and broadcasting are
individual performances, 5 it is difficult to see how a license to
the receiver can be implied. Furthermore if the spirit of the copy-
right act is looked to, it will be seen that its purpose was to
adequately reward composers and authors for their creations.
Since radio has undoubtedly damaged the composers' previous
chief source of income (sheet music sales) it would seem only
fair that radio should supply the revenue needed to balance the
loss.
Profit
The argument which has given the courts most trouble with
regard to the public-performance-for-profit clause has been based
on the word "profit." A lower federal court early construed the
word and the phrase in which it occurs as nothing more than a
protection to those persons who do not perform the composition
publicly and for profit.3 6 By way of dicta the court said that the
protection extended to street parades, schools, educational or
similar public occasions and exhibitions. Some time later the
Supreme Court of the United States held that there was no pro-
29. Harms v. Martans Club [19271 1 Ch. 526; Messager v. British Broad-
casting Co., Ltd. C1927] 2 K.B. 543.
30. Shafter, op. cit. supra note 1, at 205.
31. Ibid. See also Performing Right Society, Ltd. v. Hammond's Brad-
ford Brewery Co., Ltd., 49 T.L.R. 410 (1933), noted in (1934) 5 Air L. Rev. 83;
Canadian Performing Right Soc. v. Ford Hotel, 2 D.L.R. 391 (1935).
32. Buck v. Debaum, 40 F. (2d) 734 (S.D. Cal. 1929).
33. Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191 (note 5), 51 S.Ct. 410,
75 L.Ed. 971 (1931).
34. Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 51 S.Ct. 410, 75 L.Ed.
971 (1931).
35. Ibid.
36. Hubbell v. Royal Pastime Amusement Co., 242 Fed. 1002 (S.D. N.Y.
1917).
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tection in the case of an hotel which hired an orchestra to play
copyrighted songs in its dining room, although no direct charge
was made.87 Mr. Justice Holmes, in the course of the opinion, cor-
rectly pointed out that the defendant's performances were not
eleemosynary. "They are part of a total for which the public
pays, and the fact that the price of the whole is attributed to a
particular item which those present are expected to order, is not
important. It is true that the music is not the sole object, but
neither is the food, which probably could be got cheaper else-
where. '" 8 Similarly, it has been held that the playing of excerpts
of copyrighted musical compositions in moving picture theaters
to which a charge for admission has been made is a "performance
for profit" within the meaning of the copyright act,8 9 as is also
an unauthorized performance in a dance hall to which admission
has been charged.40
With this wealth of precedent to rely on, in cases involving
broadcasting, the courts showed reluctance in imposing liability
when there was an unauthorized performance of a copyrighted
composition. This was because it was difficult to show a direct
profit. However, the matter was settled in 1923. A department
store selling radio equipment conducted a radio station, the cost
of which was charged against the general expenses of the busi-
ness. Every program was prefaced with the statement that the
program was being presented through the courtesy of that par-
ticular department store. Each program ended the same way. An
unauthorized rendition of a copyrighted composition was given
and the court properly granted an injunction, holding that the
purpose of the performance was profit for the store, whether this
purpose was realized or not.41 Since then there seems to have
been no question as to the liability of the person promoting the
program, whether he is broadcaster himself or the individual
who purchased the privilege of using the broadcasting facilities.
A different question is presented when "time" has b~en
bought from a broadcaster and the program is presented entirely
by the person purchasing the time. In such cases the program to
be presented is entirely under the control of the sponsor. What
is the broadcaster's liability if there is an unauthorized rendition
of a copyrighted composition? In the early days of radio, the acts
37. Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591, 37 S.Ct. 232, 61 L.Ed. 511 (1917).
38. Ibid.
39. Harmes v. Cohen, 279 Fed. 276 (E.D. Pa. 1922).
40. Irving Berlin, Inc. v. Daigle, 31 F. (2d) 832 (C.C.A. 5th, 1929).
41. Witmark & Sons v. Bamberger & Co., 291 Fed. 776 (D.C. N.J. 1923).
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of the broadcaster were considered as passive. He was likened to
a workman who rigged up a loudspeaker in an auditorium so
that all might hear. Broadcasting was considered as giving the
authorized performer a larger audience, and not as a distinct
performance of the copyrighted composition on the part of the
broadcaster. Consequently, if the performer was authorized, there
could be no action against the broadcaster. 2 But this idea of pas-
sivity did not last long. Two years later another federal court
held that the acts of the broadcaster must be considered as active.
The court argued that the analogy to the workman is not proper.
It could not be said that ". . . the broadcaster merely opens the
window, and the orchestra does the rest. On the contrary, the
acts of the broadcaster are found in the reactions of his instru-
ments, constantly animated and controlled by himself, and those
acts are quite as continuous and infinitely more complex than the
playing of the selection by the members of the orchestra."4
The foregoing discussion of the profit argument and the man-
ner in which it has been handled by the courts shows that as yet
the word "profit" has no settled meaning. This is because the
profit is sometimes so well concealed that all facts have to be
considered before it can be found. It is submitted that the term
should continue to have no fixed meaning. This will enable the
courts to examine every case anew and will afford them an op-
portunity to crush any ingenious scheme to evade the letter or
the spirit of the copyright act.
RIGHTS OF THE ARTIST
Primarily, in turning from a consideration of the rights that
composers have in their musical compositions to the rights of
artists, we turn from a consideration of rights that have statutes
as their mainsprings to a determination of rights that have been
worked out wholly by the courts. The courts have been consistent
in holding that no copyright has at any time afforded protection
to an actor, singer or musician. 44 But this fact has not prevented
the application, perhaps unconsciously, of the spirit of copyright,
which is to reward for any artistic endeavor. This has been done
by a singular method.
It has been suggested that a performing artist through his
42. Remick & Co. v. General Electric Co., 4 F. (2d) 160 (S.D. N.Y. 1924).
43. Ibid.
44. Fuller v. Bemis, 50 Fed. 926 (S.D. N.Y. 1892); Barnes v. Miner, 122
Fed. 480 (S.D. N.Y. 1903); Bloom & Hamlin v. Nixon, 125 Fed. 977 (E.D. Pa.
1903).
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industry, skill and individual personality creates a product dif-
ferent from the rendition of the same musical selection by other
performers. 4 5 For that reason it has been suggested that this new
creation should be subject to protection by the copyright statute."6
However, no case has arisen wherein this idea was considered by
the court as a basis for its decision, at least not since the adoption
of the copyright act of 1909.41 Instead, the courts have given re-
lief on the asserted ground of protecting a common law property
right. This protection has been effected by means of a restriction
on the performance through an extension of the theory of unfair
competition."
The courts have made fairly clear the manner in which cases
involving the rights of artists are to be handled. Foremost among
the decisions is the case of Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Sta-
tion 4 wherein the plaintiff sought to prevent the broadcasting
of his recorded performances. When he made the recordings the
legend "For home use only" was stamped on the records. The
defendant unauthorizedly used these records in his broadcasts,
whereupon plaintiff brought suit for an injunction. The court
chose to treat the case as one of novel impression and after point-
ing out that the rights of an orchestra were not subject to pro-
tection by the copyright act, the court proceeded to hold that:
(1) A musician who by his interpretation contributes something
of novel, intellectual, or artistic value to a musical composition
of another, has participated in the creation of a product in which
he is entitled to a right of property; (2) This right is not lost by
publication when sold for use in records that have the legend
"For home use only" on them; (3) Such a restriction is not in
restraint of trade and not so unreasonable that it cannot be en-
forced in equity. Having decided these primary principles, the
court proceeded to a discussion of the equitable doctrine of un-
fair competition,0 and held that, although this doctrine rests on
the restraint of fraud and deception generally, the presence of
these elements is not an indispensable prerequisite to equitable
45. See Note (1939) 10 Air L. Rev. 315.
46. See Note (1938) 9 Air L. Rev. 99.
47. See note 44, supra.
48. McClintock, Handbook of Equity (1936) 259 et seq., 262 et seq., §§ 144,
146; Walsh, A Treatise on Equity (1930) 221 et seq., 244 et seq. The foundation
case for the theory of unfair competition is Associated Press v. International
News Service, 248 U.S. 215, 39 S.Ct. 68, 63 L.Ed. 211 (1918).
49. 327 Pa. 433, 194 Atl. 631 (1937).
50. See note 48, supra. See also Cheney Bros. v. Davis Silk Corp., 35 F.
(2d) 279 (C.C.A. 2d, 1929); Associated Press v. KVOS, Inc., 80 F. (2d) 575
(C.C.A. 9th, 1935).
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relief; and that, under certain circumstances equity will protect
the unfair appropriation of the products of another's labor or
talent.
Although the whole court agreed with the conclusion of the
case there was a strong dissent as to the rationale. Justice Maxey
preferred to base his conclusion on the doctrine of the right of
privacy.61 By drawing an analogy between an artist and a writer
of letters,5 2 or a photographer, 3 the judge came to the conclusion
that "any interprefer of a musical or any other kind of composi-
tion has an interest in his interpretation to which the law accords
the status of a right and which it will protect." The judge par-
ticularly objected to the requirement in the majority opinion
that the production constitute a novel and artistic creation. In
connection with that, he said, ". . . an individual's right to pro-
tection against an invasion of his real property never depends
on its value; that is a factor only in the measure of damages....
The true test is whether the thing in question is 'capable of iden-
tification so that exclusive ownership may be asserted.'"
It is submitted that the position taken in the dissenting
opinion is too broad. Although the principles enunciated therein
would be much easier to apply than those of the main opinion,
they would give rise to innumerable occasions in which, for one
reason or another, it would be unwise to restrain a performance.
In the principal case, by making the existence of a property right
a prerequisite to relief, the court placed itself in a position to
deny relief should the occasion demand it. It could do this by an
application of the maxim, "Equity will protect only property
rights." Although the feudal idea that property is the sole source
of human satisfaction is unsound, yet the maxim has served and
still serves as a convenient method for the courts in denying re-
lief which they deem inexpedient. As one writer has pointed out,
the existence of a property right is seldom a controlling consid-
eration.54 Be that as it may, the opinion of the majority in the
principal case seems to have become firmly established in the
lower federal courts. 55 The real solution of the problem lies not
51. Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy (1890) 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193.
52. Dennis v. LeClerc, 1 Mart. (O.S.) 297, 5 Am. Dec. 713 (La. 1811); Wool-
sey v. Judd, 4 Duer. 397 (N.Y. 1855).
53. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
54. Bennett, Injunctive Protection of Personal Interests-A Factual Ap-
proach (1939) 1 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 665.
55. Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F.Supp. 490 (D.C.
Pa. 1938); Waring v. Dunlea, 26 F.Supp. 338 (E.D. N.C. 1939); R.C.C. Mfg. Co.
v. Whiteman, 28 F.Supp. 787 (S.D. N.Y. 1939).
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in seeking a remedy in the decisions, but rather, in making the
rights of artists subject to the copyright act.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing remarks indicate that the courts have gone as
far as they can, in view of the legal forms available, in the pro-
tection of a property right in human thought. Primarily, the
rights founded on the common law are rights which were recog-
nized at a time when the methods for the dissemination of ideas
were very limited. Necessarily, since the primitive mind was un-
able to contemplate the existence of an incorporeal thing, the
development of intangible property had to wait until the idea of
property rights in tangibles was fully developed. 5 This, coupled
with the fact that songs and music have always been considered
as the heritage of a people,5" retarded the recognition of such
interests.5 In 1709 this recognition received an impetus through
the passage of the first copyright statute.59 However, due to the
fact that this statute was not considered as destroying the com-
mon law rights but as creating new ones,6° in cases not covered
by the statute the courts have constantly reverted to the com-
mon law, whose natural growth had been arrested because of
the development of the more favorable statutory right. It follows
that the courts have had to adapt old forms to new conditions.
The results have not been altogether unsatisfactory. It is sub-
mitted that the time has now come for a codification of the more
satisfactory rules as they have been worked out by the courts.
This could best be effected by a complete revision of the first
two sections of the copyright act.
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